Securitisation of the terrorist threat in Kazakhstan: Central Asia and the elites (Pt 2).

This is part 2. Part 1 is here. Writing Status: ongoing

Some Central Asian governments, including Kazakhstan, see terrorist groups as dangerous adversaries and even possible political rivals, who could take their place if given an opportunity (Lain 2016). Political elites are exceedingly protective of their political and economic safety and refuse to take the risk of losing their positions (Chernykh and Burnashev 2005; Cummings 2002; Lain 2016). Such threat perception results in increased political competition for resources, which leads to more protection of said resources, especially from outsiders. As Chernykh and Burnashev (2005) illustrate this “the authoritarian nature of Central Asian regimes promotes the securitization of the fight against international terrorism to justify limiting political and economic freedoms, strengthening power structures, and maintaining existing regimes” (p. 141). From the political elites’ point of view, the counterterrorism agenda can be seen as instrumental in suppressing political opposition as another political rival, especially during the power transition. Therefore, the securitisation rhetoric must target a particular securitisation audience.

What is a securitisation audience? A securitisation audience, also known as a targeted audience, is the group of people eligible to decide on the issue at stake. Buzan et al. (1998) say that securitisation audiences are “those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept the exceptional procedures” (41). For example, depending on the issue discussed, the audience can be the parliament (if the issue is a legal concern), a wider circle of politicians (if the issue is a political lobby concern), or another group of people having the power to expedite political processes (e.g. so-called grey cardinals). Because the securitising actor needs support from the securitisation audience, it is implausible for the general public to be portrayed as the securitisation audience (Côté 2016). However, a broader public is indeed affected by securitisation processes. If the Astana elites receive significant support from such an audience across Kazakhstan, this support should not be underestimated. To sum up, the securitisation audience should possess the power to facilitate the securitised issue to be taken outside normal politics so the emergency measures can be assigned.

Securitisation analyses in non-democratic countries, due to the lack of political transparency and scrutiny, proves to be more complicated in tracing the actor-audience relations (Balzacq 2010; Wilkinson 2007). The results of securitisation can be different, varying from an intended effect to an unexpected outcome or the absence of any consequences (failed securitisation). For the securitisation analysis, we need to find a way to trace the responses of the securitisation audience to be able to differentiate between successful and failed securitisation. There are two major ways to trace securitisation steps: media reporting and legislation/societal changes. The media serves as both the platform for conveying the securitisation rhetoric and establishing the feedback from the securitisation audience (Buzan and Hansen 2009; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Vultee 2010). Legislative changes can illustrate a political change that securitisation brings in a situation of corruption or the absence of political transparency (Kaunert and Léonard 2019; Mabee 2007; Sperling and Webber 2019). In a case where the data provided by official sources is of questionable trustworthiness, our judgment of the success or failure of the securitisation process needs to adapt to the existing political conditions. In that case, legislative changes that secure emergency measures for the issue can be seen as sufficient evidence for the success of securitisation (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998).

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