This is the final part of the blog posts series on the securitisation of the terrorist threat in Kazakstan. Part 4 discusses the results of the terrorist threat securitisation in Kazakhstan and offers a few conclusions. Other parts you can find here: part 1, part 2, part 3. Writing status: draft complete
A new counterterrorism agenda influences the country as a whole and its citizens at the individual level: Accusations of terrorist activity can be and are used to curb political activism in Kazakhstan. There are cases of the terrorist threat being used for silencing civil society. For example, the case of Olesya Khalabuzar, a human rights activist who was sentenced to two years in prison for the incitement of national hatred in 2017, is illustrative of the government’s misuse of the new counterterrorism agenda. Olesya Khalabuzar, former head of the Society of Young Professionals in Almaty that later became a new political party called Justice (Spravedlivost), has advocated for fair political processes and women empowerment and a more transparent legislative system in Kazakhstan (Informburo.kz 2015). However, in March 2017, the police’s extremism fighting unit searched her office and the apartment; they confiscated all her electronic devices, and she was charged with incitement of national hatred (Bureau.kz 2017b).
According to the prosecution, Khalabuzar printed out pamphlets calling Kazakhstani people to fight for their freedom against Chinese land buyers, following the land protests of 2016. There were no witnesses or evidence of such actions presented at the hearing (Bureau.kz 2017a). The evidence presented to the court never left the room, and the pamphlets were destroyed. Olesya was sentenced to two years in prison based on Article 174 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan “incitement of hatred” (Bureau.kz 2017a). Before the hearing, Khalabuzar wrote on Facebook that she had decided to stop her political activism and focus on her family (she has three underaged children) (Centre1.com 2017). In her address, she claimed her actions to oppose the government to be wrong and that future political opposition should understand that any political change is possible only through consensus with the existing government (Centre1.com 2017).
Unsurprisingly, political observers in Kazakhstan did not believe that Khalabuzar’s decision to leave politics was not connected to being prosecuted (Centre1.com 2017). However, even after denouncing her oppositional political views and being incarcerated, the counterterrorism framework that is in place in Kazakhstan would not let her go. Olesya’s name had been added to financial and legal blacklists, which means that she could not engage in any financial activity, including receiving alimony for her children. Thus, the counterterrorism agenda was used to remove Khalabuzar from politics and ensure that her life remains a daily struggle to keep her away from possible political engagement in the future. Paradoxically, the case of Olesya Khalabuzar would become one of the numbers confirming that the new counterterrorism approach is successful, as it protects the people and the country from “extremists”.
Civil activism becomes risky under the new legislation
Another example of an outstanding misuse of the counterterrorism legislation is the case of a civil activist and human rights defender from Almaty, who was denied leaving Kazakhstan to meet European MPs to discuss the human rights situation in Kazakhstan. They were banned from leaving Kazakhstan, their bank accounts were frozen, and their parents were threatened with being dismissed from their jobs. The activist was ordered to leave Almaty, the city of residence, for the election day (9 June 2019) because they claimed to pose an extremist threat. In the official government’s response to their request to explain the travel ban, authorities stated that the reason for the ban is that they are a witness in the case against the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan political party, another central reference point in Astana’s securitisation rhetoric.
The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan [Demokraticheskij vybor Kazahstana, DVK[1]] is a party founded by Muhtar Ablyazov and Galymzhan Zhakijanov in 2002, and it has been officially banned as an extremist organisation in 2018 on the grounds of political extremism and being a threat to the safety of the state (Sputnik.kz 2018). Muhtar Ablyazov, who has been involved in the BTA bank money scandal and accused of money laundering, is believed to incite hatred and called for a coup in Kazakhstan from abroad (allegedly, he resides in France) (Sputnik.kz 2018). He was sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2017 in absentia, and Galymzhan Zhakijanov got convicted for seven years in prison in 2002, which he served and then moved to the US, and he has not been involved in politics since. In his exile, Muhtar Ablyazov is believed to have orchestrated public unrest, calling for people to continue to support the DVK and its values. Alleged connections with the DVK has been used as a reason to detain civil activists, showing the usage of the counterterrorism legislation for political purposes far away from fighting terrorism.
The DVK allegations as a political tool
On 19 November 2019, four political activists, Oksana Shevchuk, Gulzipa Dzhaukerova, Zhazira Demeuova, and Anuar Ashiralieyv, were accused of supporting the DVK and were sentenced to one year of restricted freedom (Radio Azattyq 2019). This sentence will affect their lives for longer than one year – as well as Olesya Khalabuzar, they will be added to the extremists’ list what would infringe their work opportunities and engagement with financial institutions. Rysbek Sarsenbaj, a political activist and journalist, argued that the case was politically motivated as the prosecution did not present enough evidence for a conviction: the infamous article 405 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan “Organization and participation in the activities of a public or religious association or other organization after a court decision to prohibit their activities or liquidate in connection with their extremism or terrorism” was used against them (Radio Azattyq 2019).
Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (KIBHR) recognises both articles 174 and 405, when used without any compelling evidence, as politically motivated accusations and the government’s attempt to restrict people’s rights and freedoms. Besides, KIBHR argues against labelling the DVK as an extremist organisation, as it does not find any extremist arguments in the DVK’s agenda (Bureau.kz 2018). One can further argue that the approach of using particular articles of the Criminal Code to silence political activists and opposition appears to be systemic.
The cases discussed above are part of a more comprehensive strategy that the government uses to silence political opposition, such as the DVK and any undesirable civil activism. The cases against Olesya Khalabuzar, Oksana Shevchuk, Gulzipa Dzhaukerova, Zhazira Demeuova, Anuar Ashiralieyv, as well as political pressure against other activists have been illustrative that the threat of terrorism (or extremism as often the authorities do not make a clear distinction using both terms interchangeably) being used for political purposes that can only be seen as politically motivated and restricting freedoms. The use of the counterterrorism agenda to silence human rights activists has resulted in new social media connections among the Kazakhstani public.
Restricting freedoms: can we trust the Qaznet Trust Network?
For example, the introduction of the Qaznet Trust Network, a new security certificate that should keep the Kazakhstani people safe from terrorism propaganda, allows the government to spy on people. Astana does not deny the spying capabilities of the new software. However, it promised the population to not use it for any purposes other than fighting terrorism – a statement that has been met with understandable distrust from the public (Kursiv.kz 2019). Increased attention to the terrorism threat creates an opportunity for Astana to put aside democratic political avenues and create an alternative to normal politics via the securitisation of the terrorist threat.
The threat of terrorism regarding information security has been a hot topic in Kazakhstan for quite some time. After the 2016 terrorist attacks, the government invested significant effort into obtaining more control over the media, as seen in the 2018-2022 counterterrorism program. In 2018, a law was passed, expanding law enforcement agencies’ mandate, allowing the secret service and other government agencies to bring down communications in a case of emergency (Tengrinews.kz 2018). Besides, all Kazakhstan’s residents had to register their mobile phones with their providers or face being denied access to mobile networks after 1 January 2019 (Profit.kz 2018).
In July 2019, the information security agenda reached a new level: the Kazakhstani government announced an introduction of a security certificate called Qaznet Trust Network, the initiative claimed to protect people from terrorism and religious extremism online (Sputnik.kz 2019b). The government promised that the certificate would block unwanted (alleged extremists) Internet content, prevent hacker attacks and that the certificate poses no threat to the users’ freedom (Sputnik.kz 2019b). Unsurprisingly, the government would be the judge and the jury of what content has to be blocked.
However, following the social media blackouts and the countrywide requirement to register mobile phones, Kazakhstanis had a hard time believing that after installing the security certificate, the government would stop blocking only terrorism-related content. Such suspicion is justified as the law enforcement agencies are not denying that the certificate allows them to read personal communications (Sputnik.kz 2019c, 2019a). After Nazarbayev’s resignation in March 2019, the situation with the Internet being blocked reached its peak: messengers such as WhatsApp and Telegram have been blocked daily, video service YouTube was extremely slow in the evening. Some connected it with the government trying to disrupt public unrest before and after the presidential elections. Consequently, many were afraid that new software would allow the government to spy on the people, even though installing the certificate is not mandatory yet.
Thus, the restrictions of social media came gradually, slowly limiting peoples’ freedoms and choices. In Kazakhstan, Twitter and Facebook are popular. They are used by both the government to disseminate their rhetoric and the public to counter the rhetoric or voice their protest. However, with the introduction of the Qaznet Trust Network, the situation could change drastically, stripping the Kazakhstanis of their last social platform for grievances sharing. Such a crackdown on social media would mean an unequivocal decision of the government to follow an authoritarian route in the future. Furthermore, this can already be seen in the new counterterrorism agenda for 2018-2020 years, as 146 million tenge has been allocated solely for social media and Internet counterterrorism activities (National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan n.d.).
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Kazakhstani people are highly suspicious of new technological advances in the name of fighting terrorism because they can piece together the evidence to paint the complete picture of Kazakhstan’s shrinking rights and freedoms for the sake of counterterrorism. The democratic intentions of a government that uses counterterrorism legislation for political prosecution have to be questioned by domestic and international communities. However, a close alliance between Kazakhstan and Russia in the counterterrorism sphere allows for a conclusion that Kazakhstan might have adopted a somewhat authoritarian approach to fighting terrorism and might not be open to international scrutiny on the matter. This worrying trend might mark the beginning of a less democratic post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan than many have hoped.
Conclusions
The primary purpose of any counterterrorism agenda is to fight terrorism. However, there is a grey area of how to do that and at what cost. Unfortunately, in Kazakhstan, we can see a general trend of counterterrorism legislation silencing political opposition and civil activism. Kazakhstan is in the process of securitising the terrorist threat. Still, we can already see some results that show the success of the securitisation: the legislation being used against the opposition and political activists and people’s freedoms being restricted in the name of fighting terrorism. The securitisation of the terrorist threat allows the new administration to continue the restrictions of the public and the opposition, threatening activists with terrorism charges.
Securitisation, fuelled by the absence of meaningful democratic changes and the elites’ desire to keep their power, creates an alternative to normal politics. Thus, the securitisation process sustains the gap between the elites and the public, leaving the people feeling powerless and excluded from critical political processes, resulting in the public being alienated from politics.
The Kazakhstani people will continue to experience the consequences of the misuse of the counterterrorism agenda unless the government changes its political course. The abuse of the counterterrorism legislation may lead to more restrictions on the freedom of speech and civil activism, which, in turn, would cause further tensions for Astana, both domestically and internationally.
References
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[1] Banned in Kazakhstan as an extremist organisation according to the Decision of the Yesil District Court of Nur-Sultan on March 13, 2018.