Russia has seen dramatic political and military development in the last 24h: Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of Wagner Group, has officially declared his intentions to go back to Moscow to challenge the Ministry of Defense and Shoigu himself in a rebellion he calls the “March of Justice” (marsh spravedlivosti). Prigozhin claims that the Russian forces have been sabotaging the Wagner forces, striking their positions from behind, which has infuriated Prigozhin. Russia’s Ministry of Defense refuses the claims that the Wagner forces were attacked by them, arguing that it is a Western false flag operation and has ordered Prigozhin’s rebellion to disban. So, what is happening in Russia?
As of 10.00 24 June in London, Prigozhin’s telegram channel shows him and the Wagner forces in Rostov on Don (Rostov na Donu), which several Russian telegram channels sharing videos of the situation in Rostov, where the city centre has been taken by Wagner, with no civil pushback or military resistance from Russian law enforcement. Putin addressed the nation in this speech, not naming names but alluring to “those in charge” of the situation as treators and the attempt of Wagner to get to Moscow as treason. Putin argues that the threat to Russia in this critical is is a deadly threat, and is absolutely unacceptable in such a time when Russians should unite in front of the threat from the West. He made parallels between the current situation and the First World War, trying to add to the importance of the topic with a metaphor. Prigozhin denies the allegations of treason, insisting that the Wagner Group are Russian patriots who are against corruption and bureaucracy.
Counterterrorism protocols: will they help to defend the regime?
An interesting development in the usage of Russia’s counterterrorism protocols can be seen in the current situation, as Moscow, Moscow oblast (region) and Voronezh oblast (region) have announced counterterrorism protocols being put in place. This approach to using counterterrorism measures against the Wagner Group reiterates that counterterrorism in Russia represents much more than just a tool to fight terrorism, as it clearly has been deployed to quell the conflict with Prigozhin. The engagement of counterterrorism measures also shows that counterterrorism has become another layer of protection for the regime, allowing for faster access to more subduing resources: for example, there are murmurs of Russian internet providers blocking the news about Prigozhin or Wagner group.
Will the public help or oppose Prigozhin’s rebellion?
My thoughts about the situation so far: first, I am interested to see how the Wagner groups will be treated as they make their way to Moscow. I expect very little civic resistance, as ordinary citizens would prefer to stay away from the situation. A very timely poll from Levada showed that in April 2023 almost 40% of respondents said that they are not interested in politics and do not understand it, while 25% said that they feel they cannot influence politics. Thus, over half of the respondents showed no interest in politics, which tells me that Putin’s calls for unity in front of the enemy might not result in more than some online support for the president in pro-Kremlin telegram channels.
Second, contrary to Putin’s sentiment of treason and blaming the West for the current situation, I believe many Russians will find Prigozhin’s foray against corruption quite relatable. Corruption in Russia is rampant, and it would be hard to find anyone who has not been affected by it. The collective memory of the Soviet past, when most goods and services were available only to the elites, has created an almost heroic attitude to the underdog, as portrayed in films like Brat (Brother) and Brigada (Law of the Lawless). Although Prigozhin can hardly be seen as coming from “the bottom” as he has been part of the elites and Putin’s circle for some time, now he is placing himself in opposition to the current leadership of Russian military forces and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). His clear anti-corruption position, together with his first-hand experience of the battlefields in Ukraine (as opposed to the MoD’s absence of it) will have worked in Prigozhin’s favour and earn him some respect and patience from the public.
What does Prigozhin’s rebellion mean for Ukraine?
This internal power conflict presents an opportunity for the Ukrainian forces to gain more ground in the counteroffensive operation while the Russian forces are divided and somewhat demoralised. Some of the Ukrainian commanders have shown a similar understanding of the situation and the Freedom of Russia Legion called for more engagement. Anton Gerashchenko said that now “Ukraine has become a few steps closer to complete victory over Russia” (tweet here). The developments on this front might not be seen for a couple of days as the Ukrainians have been protective of their actions being shown and discussed in the media. Undeniably, this is an opportunity to push the Russian forces back that Ukraine cannot miss.
The events are unfolding very fast, with unconfirmed information coming that fighting has started near Voronezh, meaning the Wagner are making their way to Moscow. Internationally, the conflict is making ripples as I write this, with the markets reacting to the uncertainty. Volodmir Zelenski twitted that a conflict in Russia is the result of Russia’s obvious weakness that has been formed by one man (implying Vladimir Putin) and that it cannot be solved unless Russian forces leave Ukraine’s territories. Poland’s army forces are on high alert. Belarus’ President Lukashenko might have already left the country for Turkey as there have been calls to arms in Belarus. Are we on the verge of a massive political change in the region?
Update on Prigozhin’s rebellion
Prigozhin’s rebellion, or the March of Justice, as he called it, turned out to be rather short-lived. According to Prigozhin and the Kremlin’s spokesperson, Peskov, Prigozhin agreed to de-escalate the situation after negotiating with President Lukashenko (allegedly they are friends of 20 years). Prigozhin claimed that his forces are going back to avoid bloodshed among Russians, but this reasoning seems flowed, as the pilots of the helicopters that Wagner brought down during their march died, which already makes the march not bloodless. This selective counting of losses is a distinctive characteristic of Russian war reporting.
However, there are a few interesting points in the agreement that I believe stand out. First, the idea that a head of a country would negotiate with, essentially, a terrorist (as an anti-terror, or counterterrorism, protocol has been put in place to counteract Wagner’s actions) is a new and concerning development in Russian politics. Undeniably, the Kremlin would refuse to call Prigozhin a terrorist, but anyone who knows the history of the stand-off between the Kremlin and Chechen terrorists would be surprised to see such a lesser-fare attitude towards Prigozhin. This tells me two things: first, Prigozhin does have leverage and influence on the Kremlin elites or Putin himself and presents a force to be reckoned with. Second, Putin did not want to be seen as directly negotiating with Prigozhin, and by using Lukashenko as a buffer he managed to stay in the shadows and keep face.
The second interesting result is that Prigozhin will go to Belarus. There have been no details shared on what this agreement actually entails, so we will have to wait and see what Prigozhin will end up doing in Belarus. Some experts suggest that this means more engagement in the Ukrainian war for Belarus, which is possible, but it is too early to tell.
To conclude, it has been one of the most whirlwind-like days in the history of modern Russia, which will be analysed and talked about for years to come. We are yet to see if Prigozhin suffers any long-term consequences of his actions, and what the Belarusian chapter of Wanger will bring.