On the 22nd of March 2024, four assailants attacked Crocus City Hall, where a show of the Russian rock band “Picnic” was about to start. The attackers were killing the people indiscriminately and set the concert hall ablaze. On this day Russia lost 145 people dead and over 500 wounded. This makes the Crocus City Hall attack Russia’s second worst terrorist attack after Beslan.
Despite the Islamic State – Khorasan Province taking responsibility for the attack, Moscow kept insisting that Ukraine was behind the attack. Putin addressed the nation the next day, emphasising that Russia is under constant attacks from evil foreign forces. He stated Moscow’s intention to seek revenge after the attack, focusing on those who “ordered” it. Putin also mentioned the connection of the attackers to Ukraine, reiterating that the state knows who is behind it (heavenly implying that the West is behind it).
The attack raises questions about the threat of Islamic terrorism in Russia. While the threat is not new, over the last decade Russia has not seen an attack comparable to the scale of the Crocus City Hall attack. Large terrorist attacks in Russia’s past, the Dubrovka Theatre hostage-taking and the Beslan School hostage-taking were planned and carried out by Chechen separatists. The Crocus City Hall attack has changed the perception of Islamic terrorism as a threat from the North Caucasus, particularly Chechnya, to a more global threat that Russia has not experienced before.
Tensions between Russia and Central Asia are on the rise
The Crocus City Hall attack has another dimension, connected to the attackers being of Tajik origin. When the attackers were apprehended and questioned by Russian special forces, most of them required translators as they did not speak Russian. This has reignited hatred against migrants from Central Asia in Russia, resulting in police raids and mass deportations of migrants. Considering the labour shortages that Russia is experiencing and that labour migrants present around 16.5 million people, deporting migrants from Russia might be a politically driven decision.
For those Central Asia migrants who stayed, life in Russia is not getting any easier. The process of “othering” of the migrants has been accelerated by Moscow, by increased security towards migrants, identity checks, and the overall environment of distrust. Central Asian migrants have never been particularly welcomed in Russia but tolerated because they filled certain niches in the labour market. The Crocus City Hall attack has intensified the divide between “us” and “them”, “proper Russians” and migrants, who often are also Muslim.
What can we expect to see following the Crocus City Hall attack
Central Asia is moving away from Russia’s sphere of influence, even if it is a gradual move that might be less noticeable while the war in Ukraine, the crisis in Gaza, and Trump’s criminal charges are dominating the news. But Central Asia countries are looking for opportunities, and they might find that the West, especially the European Union, the Us, and the UK are more willing to engage with the region.
Undeniably, the conditions for the migrants in Russia are not expected to improve any time soon. When the trials of the Crocus City Hall attackers start, Central Asian migrants will face the resurgent hatred as the topic goes back to be covered in he news.
Conspiracy theories are already on the rise, and I would expect more of them to pop up or the existing ones to see revival after the trials start. The proposed connection of the gunmen to Ukraine special forces, the role of Belarus in the aftermath of the attack, the intriguing words of Vladimir Putin that he knows who is behind the attack of Crocus City Hall – all these aspects, and many more, should come to the forefront when the trials start.