This is a draft of an article about the securitisation of the terrorist threat and its consequences for Kazakhstan’s political future. Writing Status: ongoing.

Part 1 is a short overview of securitisation theory, its key aspects, and its use for analysis. Securitisation theory is used to explore the influence of the counterterrorism agenda on Kazakhstan’s political life and its political transition into the new presidency. Then the discussion of securitisation rhetoric is presented; public speeches and writings by politicians and legislative changes are analysed to illustrate how the threat of terrorism is used for purposes other than counterterrorism. The article concludes that Kazakhstan has some potential to become more democratic on the wave of post-Nazarbayev political change; however, the government is unlikely to stop using counterterrorism as an alternative political route. The threat of terrorism is unlikely to dissipate in the foreseeable future; thus, this alternative political channel, created by the securitisation of the terrorist threat, could be used for quelling political opposition and potential public unrest.

Securitisation theory

Securitisation theory belongs to the constructivist school of thought, providing a somewhat different take on security, such as realism. Securitisation theory, a convergence between the realist and the idealist approaches to security, represents a more versatile tool of security analysis in comparison with limiting the analysis to one school of thought, either realist or idealist (Bourbeau 2014; Buzan and Hansen 2009; Lacher 2008; Malik 2015; Watson 2012; Williams 2003). Drawing on both approaches, one of the physical manifestations and the other of ideas, the Copenhagen School equips us with a tool that is adequate to the challenges of the contemporary fast-changing world. Securitisation theory allows us to look beyond the physical aspect of national security, such as weapons or armies, introducing a socially constructed part of national security (Patomäki 2015). Therefore, identities, opinions, media participation, and the dissemination of security issues influence how security threats are managed. Thus, securitisation analysis involves not only the tangible aspect of security, such as military capacities and abilities (for example, to build and deploy military equipment or increase army conscription numbers), but it takes into account threats that are socially constructed. As Balzacq (2010, 56) notes, “securitization predominantly examines how security problems emerge, evolve and dissolve”, and it takes into account the society that receives messages about national security from different actors, processes them, and consequently either support or decline measures proposed by the actors.

How does securitisation analysis work? Securitisation theory allows us to trace various political processes that aim to raise specific issues above normal politics. Through securitisation, an issue goes from being treated via normal politics to being assigned extraordinary measures (an emergency response). The definitive distinction between normal and emergency politics is that “extraordinary politics is, in this sense, what normal politics is not” (Roe 2012, 251). For example, to make a successful legislative change in Kazakhstan, it is necessary to get approval from Parliament or fail if the proposal is declined (Ak Orda n.d., sec. 49 para 1). An attempt to change legislation would require time, expertise, and significant financial resources. However, if an issue is securitised, the normal process of passing a law amendment can be circumvented, and the problem can be assigned special measures and resources, essentially alleviating the issue above normal politics.

Through a securitisation lens, one can look at an existential threat, securitising actors, and audiences – three integral parts of any securitisation analysis. To invoke extraordinary measures, a securitising actor shows audiences that the issue at stake is an existential threat that endangers the audience’s survival. Therefore, the threat needs to be assigned top priority and emergency response (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). This is the primary mechanism that allows securitising actors to bypass normal politics to evoke the emergency response without deliberation. This is a case of successful securitisation; thereafter, the securitising actor gains political power and resources. Suppose the securitising actor was not successful at presenting an issue as an existential threat; it does not get assigned emergency measures and is managed within the framework of normal politics.

Who can be or become a securitising actor? Politicians, governments, and other agents can attempt to securitise issues in competition for resources and public attention (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998; Salter 2010). Securitising actors can be hard to pinpoint, especially in non-democratic settings where a lot of politics happens behind closed doors (Vuori 2008). In the case of securitisation of the terrorist threat in Kazakhstan, it is possible to recognise Kazakhstan’s political elite and the government as the main securitising actors. They are the actors who have access to Parliament; thus, they can influence the parliamentarians. To be able to convince their audience of the necessity of the emergency measures, securitising actors must have political credibility and possess certain legitimacy. In non-democratic political regimes, the elites represent the moving force behind political change, as it is often connected to the elites’ personal and economic wellbeing (Yakovlev 2016). However, it is feasible to accept that the main securitising actors in Kazakhstan are political elites close to the current and former presidents, as Tokayev is part of Nazarbayev’s immediate circle. It is unlikely that the recent political transition would have changed the securitisation powers disposition: Nazarbayev’s successor seems to be following a similar political agenda, supporting Kazakhstan’s multi-vectorial political course and honouring existing friendships and alliances.

In Kazakhstan, securitising actors’ power is more related to their political position than their political personality. This observation reinforces the idea that it is rather often the case when certain political positions have more political power than others regardless of the person occupying the post (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998; Taureck 2006). However, if a person occupying such a post has a strong political personality (famous, likeable, charismatic, or a military veteran), they would be an even more influential securitising actor, with the political position and character reinforcing each other. An example of this type of securitising actor is former president Nursultan Nazarbayev. After the resignation, Nazarbayev remained the Chairman of the Security Council of Kazakhstan and the Chairman of Nur Otan, Kazakhstan’s leading political party. Even after losing his position as the president, Nazarbayev retained significant political influence in Kazakhstan and abroad. Therefore, a securitisation actor’s capabilities are often defined by political circumstances and existing political frameworks but are not the only reason someone can become a securitising actor.

To summarise, this study primarily focuses on the securitisation of the terrorist threat in Kazakhstan; thus, the terrorist threat is used to illustrate how an issue can rise above normal politics to the extent when it affects both policymaking and citizens’ wellbeing. I argue that the political elites securitise the threat of terrorism for their own political and economic gains; therefore, this securitisation process can be seen in many aspects of counterterrorism in the country. This analysis draws on various sources of information to make its case: the results of counterterrorism programmes (real and claimed), the legislative changes regarding terrorism, and the securitisation rhetoric to illustrate how the threat of terrorism has become an existential threat in Kazakhstan.

References

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